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Abstract11
We prove that it is PPAD-hard to compute a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game with twenty12
actions per player. This is the first PPAD hardness result for a game with a constant number of actions13
per player where the interaction graph is acyclic. Along the way we show PPAD-hardness for finding14
an -fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance, when  is any constant less than (
√
2− 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071.15
This lifts the hardness regime from polynomially small approximations in k-dimensions to constant16
approximations in two-dimensions, and our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial17
upper bound of 0.5.18
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1 Introduction23
A polymatrix game is a succinctly represented many-player game. The players are represented24
by vertices in an interaction graph, where each edge of the graph specifies a two-player game25
that is to be played by the adjacent vertices. Each player picks a pure strategy, or action, and26
then plays that action in all of the edge-games that they are involved with. They then receive27
the sum of the payoffs from each of those games. A Nash equilibrium prescribes a mixed28
strategy to each player, with the property that no player has an incentive to unilaterally29
deviate from their assigned strategy.30
Constant-action polymatrix games have played a central role in the study of equilibrium31
computation. The classical PPAD-hardness result for finding Nash equilibria in bimatrix32
games [4] uses constant-action polymatrix games as an intermediate step in the reduction [4,5].33
Rubinstein later showed that there exists a constant  > 0 such that computing an -34
approximate Nash equilibrium in two-action bipartite polymatrix games is PPAD-hard [15],35
which was the first result of its kind to give hardness for constant .36
These hardness results create polymatrix games whose interaction graphs contain cycles.37
This has lead researchers to study acyclic polymatrix games, with the hope of finding38
tractable cases. Kearns, Littman, and Singh claimed to produce a polynomial-time algorithm39
for finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-action tree graphical game [11], where graphical40
games are a slight generalization of polymatrix games. However, their algorithm does not41
work, which was pointed out by Elkind, Goldberg, and Goldberg [9], who also showed that42
the natural fix gives an exponential-time algorithm.43
Elkind, Goldberg, and Goldberg also show that a Nash equilibrium can be found in44
polynomial time for two-action graphical games whose interaction graphs contain only paths45
and cycles. They also show that finding a Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard when the interaction46
graph has pathwidth at most four, but there appears to be some issues with their approach47
(see Appendix A). Later work of Barman, Ligett, and Piliouras [1] provided a QPTAS for48
constant-action tree polymatrix games, and then Ortiz and Irfan [13] gave an FPTAS for49
this case. All three papers, [1,9,13], leave as a main open problem the question of whether it50
is possible to find a Nash equilibrium in a tree polymatrix game in polynomial time.51
Our contribution. In this work we show that finding a Nash equilibrium in twenty-52
action tree polymatrix games is PPAD-hard. Combined with the known PPAD containment53
of polymatrix games [5], this implies that the problem is PPAD-complete. This is the first54
hardness result for polymatrix (or graphical) games in which the interaction graph is acyclic,55
and decisively closes the open question raised by prior work: tree polymatrix games cannot56
be solved in polynomial time unless PPAD is equal to P.57
Our reduction produces a particularly simple class of interaction graphs: all of our games58
are played on caterpillar graphs (see Figure 3) which consist of a single path with small59
one-vertex branches affixed to every node. These graphs have pathwidth 1, so we obtain a60
stark contrast with prior work: two-action path polymatrix games can be solved in polynomial61
time [9], but twenty-action pathwidth-1-caterpillar polymatrix games are PPAD-hard.62
Our approach is founded upon Mehta’s proof that 2D-LinearFIXP is PPAD-hard [12].63
We show that her reduction can be implemented by a synchronous arithmetic circuit with64
constant width. We then embed the constant-width circuit into a caterpillar polymatrix65
game, where each player in the game is responsible for simulating all gates at a particular66
level of the circuit. This differs from previous hardness results [5, 15], where each player is67
responsible for simulating exactly one gate from the circuit.68
Along the way, we also substantially strengthen Mehta’s hardness result for LinearFIXP.69
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She showed PPAD-hardness for finding an exact fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance, and70
an -fixed point of a kD-LinearFIXP instance, where  is polynomially small. We show PPAD-71
hardness for finding an -fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance when  is any constant72
less than (
√
2 − 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071. So we have lifted the hardness regime from polynomially73
small approximations in k-dimensions to constant approximations in two-dimensions, and74
our constant is substantial when compared to the trivial upper bound of 0.5.75
Related work. The class PPAD was defined by Papadimitriou [14]. Years later, Daskalakis,76
Goldberg, and Papadimitriou (DGP) [5] proved PPAD-hardness for graphical games and77
3-player normal form games. Chen, Deng, and Teng (CDT) [4] extended this result to78
2-player games and proved that there is no FPTAS for the problem unless PPAD = P. The79
observations made by CDT imply that DGP’s result also holds for polymatrix games with80
constantly-many actions (but with cycles in the interaction graph) for an exponentially81
small . More recently, Rubinstein [16] showed that there exists a constant  > 0 such that82
computing an −NE in binary-action bipartite polymatrix games is PPAD-hard (again with83
cycles in the interaction graph).84
Etessami and Yiannakakis [10] defined the classes FIXP and LinearFIXP and they proved85
that LinearFIXP = PPAD. Mehta [12] strengthened these results by proving that two-86
dimensional LinearFIXP equals PPAD, building on the result of Chen and Deng who proved87
that 2D-discrete Brouwer is PPAD-hard [3].88
On the positive side, Cai and Daskalakis [2], proved that NE can be efficiently found in89
polymatrix games where every 2-player game is zero-sum. Ortiz and Irfan [13] and Deligkas,90
Fearnley, and Savani [7] produced QPTASs for polymatrix games of bounded treewidth (in91
addition to the FPTAS of [13] for tree polymatrix games mentioned above). For general92
polymatrix games, the only positive result to date is a polynomial-time algorithm to compute93
a ( 12 + δ)-NE [8]. Finally, an empirical study on algorithms for exact and approximate NE in94
polymatrix games can be found in [6].95
2 Preliminaries96
Polymatrix games. An n-player polymatrix game is defined by an undirected interaction97
graph G = (V,E) with n vertices, where each vertex represents a player, and the edges of98
the graph specify which players interact with each other. Each player in the game has m99
actions, and each edge (v, u) ∈ E of the graph is associated with two m×m matrices Av,u100
and Au,v which specify a bimatrix game that is to be played between the two players, where101
Av,u specifies the payoffs to player v from their interaction with player u.102
Each player in the game selects a single action, and then plays that action in all of the103
bimatrix games with their neighbours in the graph. Their payoff is the sum of the payoffs104
that they obtain from each of the individual bimatrix games.105
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over the m actions of that player,106
a strategy profile is a vector s = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) where si is a mixed strategy for player i. The107
vector of expected payoffs for player i under strategy profile s is pi(s) :=
∑
(i,j)∈E A
i,jsj . The108
expected payoff to player i under s is si ·pi(s). A strategy profile is a mixed Nash equilibrium109
if si · pi(s) = maxpi(s) for all i, which means that no player can unilaterally change their110
strategy in order to obtain a higher expected payoff. In this paper we are interested in the111
problem of computing a Nash equilibrium of a tree polymatrix game, which is a polymatrix112
game in which the interaction graph is a tree.113
Arithmetic circuits. For the purposes of this paper, each gate in an arithmetic circuit114
will operate only on values that lie in the range [0, 1]. In our construction, we will use four115
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specific gates, called constant introduction denoted by c, bounded addition denoted by +b,116
bounded subtraction denoted by −b, and bounded multiplication by a constant denoted by ∗bc.117
These gates are formally defined as follows.118
c is a gate with no inputs that outputs some fixed constant c ∈ [0, 1].119
Given inputs x, y ∈ [0, 1] the gate x+b y := min (x+ y, 1).120
Given inputs x, y ∈ [0, 1] the gate x−b y := max (x− y, 0).121
Given an input x ∈ [0, 1], and a constant c ≥ 0, the gate x ∗b c := min (x ∗ c, 1).122
These gates perform their operation, but also clip the output value so that it lies in the123
range [0, 1]. Note that the constant c in the ∗bc gate is specified as part of the gate.124
Multiplication of two inputs is not allowed.125
We will build arithmetic circuits that compute functions of the form [0, 1]d → [0, 1]d. A126
circuit C = (I,G) consists of a set I = {in1, in2, . . . , ind} containing d input nodes, and a set127
G = {g1, g2, . . . , gk} containing k gates. Each gate gi has a type from the set {c,+b,−b, ∗bc},128
and if the gate has one or more inputs, these are taken from the set I ∪G. The connectivity129
structure of the gates is required to be a directed acyclic graph.130
The depth of a gate, denoted by d(g) is the length of the longest path from that gate to an131
input. We will build synchronous circuits, meaning that all gates of the form gx = gy +b gz132
satisfy d(gx) = 1 + d(gy) = 1 + d(gz), and likewise for gates of the form gx = gy −b gz. There133
are no restrictions on c-gates, or ∗bc-gates.134
The width of a particular level i of the circuit is defined to be w(i) = |{gj : d(gj) = i}|,135
which is the number of gates at that level. The width of a circuit is defined to be w(C) =136
maxi w(i), which is the maximum width taken over all the levels of the circuit.137
Straight line programs. A convenient way of specifying an arithmetic circuit is to write138
down a straight line program (SLP) [10].139
SLP 1 Example
x ← 0.5
z ← x +b in1
x ← x *b 0.5
out1 ← z +b x
SLP 2 if and for example
x ← in1 *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , 10} do
if i is even then
x ← x +b 0.1
end
end
out1 ← x *b 1
140
Each line of an SLP consists of a statement of the form v ← op, where v is a variable, and141
op consists of exactly one arithmetic operation from the set set {c,+b,−b, ∗bc}. The inputs142
to the gate can be any variable that is defined before the line, or one of the inputs to the143
circuit. We permit variables to be used on the left hand side in more than one line, which144
effectively means that we allow variables to be overwritten.145
It is easy to turn an SLP into a circuit. Each line is turned into a gate, and if variable v146
is used as the input to gate g, then we set the corresponding input of g to be the gate g′147
that corresponds to the line that most recently assigned a value to v. SLP 1 above specifies148
a circuit with four gates, and the output of the circuit will be 0.75 +b in1.149
For the sake of brevity, we also allow if statements and for loops in our SLPs. These150
two pieces of syntax can be thought of as macros that help us specify a straight line program151
concisely. The arguments to an if statement or a for loop must be constants that do not152
depend on the value of any gate in the circuit. When we turn an SLP into a circuit, we unroll153
every for loop the specified number of times, and we resolve every if statement by deleting154
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the block if the condition does not hold. So the example in SLP 2 produces a circuit with155
seven gates: two gates correspond to the lines x ← in1 *b 1 and out1 ← x *b 1, while156
there are five gates corresponding to the line x ← x +b 0.1, since there are five copies of157
the line remaining after we unroll the loop and resolve the if statements. The output of the158
resulting circuit will be 0.5 +b in1.159
Liveness of variables and circuit width. Our ultimate goal will be to build circuits that160
have small width. To do this, we can keep track of the number of variables that are live at161
any one time in our SLPs. A variable v is live at line i of an SLP if both of the following162
conditions are met.163
There exists a line with index j ≤ i that assigns a value to v.164
There exists a line with index k ≥ i that uses the value assigned to v as an argument.165
The number of variables that are live at line i is denoted by live(i), and the number of166
variables used by an SLP is defined to be maxi live(i), which is the maximum number of167
variables that are live at any point in the SLP. The following is proved in Appendix B.168
I Lemma 1. An SLP that uses w variables can be transformed into a polynomial-size169
synchronous circuit of width w.170
3 Hardness of 2D-Brouwer171
In this section, we consider the following problem. It is a variant of two-dimensional Brouwer172
that uses only our restricted set of bounded gates.173
I Definition 2 (2D-Brouwer). Given an arithmetic circuit F : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 using gates174
from the set {c, +b, −b, ∗b c}, find x ∈ [0, 1]2 such that F (x) = x.175
As a starting point for our reduction, we will show that this problem is PPAD-hard. Our176
proof will follow the work of Mehta [12], who showed that the closely related 2D-LinearFIXP177
problem is PPAD-hard. There are two differences between 2D-Brouwer and 2D-LinearFIXP.178
In 2D-LinearFIXP, all internal gates of the circuit take and return values from R rather179
than [0, 1].180
2D-LinearFIXP takes a circuit that uses gates from the set {c,+,−, ∗c,max,min}, where181
none of these gates bound their outputs to be in [0, 1].182
In this section, we present an altered version of Mehta’s reduction, which will show that183
finding an -solution to 2D-Brouwer is PPAD-hard for a constant .184
Discrete Brouwer. The starting point for Mehta’s reduction is the two-dimensional185
discrete Brouwer problem, which is known to be PPAD-hard [3]. This problem is defined over186
a discretization of the unit square [0, 1]2 into a grid of points G = {0, 1/2n, 2/2n, . . . , (2n −187
1)/2n}2. The input to the problem is a Boolean circuit C : G→ {1, 2, 3} the assigns one of188
three colors to each point. The coloring will respect the following boundary conditions.189
We have C(0, i) = 1 for all i ≥ 0.190
We have C(i, 0) = 2 for all i > 0.191
We have C( 2n−12n , i) = C(i,
2n−1
2n ) = 3 for all i > 0.192
These conditions can be enforced syntactically by modifying the circuit. The problem is to193
find a grid square that is trichromatic, meaning that all three colors appear on one of the194
four points that define the square.195
I Definition 3 (DiscreteBrouwer). Given a Boolean circuit C : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {1, 2, 3}196
that satisfies the boundary conditions, find a point x, y ∈ {0, 1}n such that, for each color197
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, there exists a point (x′, y′) with C(x′, y′) = i where x′ ∈ {x, x + 1} and198
y′ ∈ {y, y + 1}.199
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2
3
1
 
︷ ︸︸ ︷
(a) Our stronger boundary conditions.
(−1, 1−√2) ·  (1, 1−√2) · 
(0, 1) · 
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(
√
2−1)·
(b) The mapping from colors to vectors.
Figure 1 Reducing -ThickDisBrouwer to 2D-Brouwer.
Our first deviation from Mehta’s reduction is to insist on the following stronger boundary200
condition, which is shown in Figure 1a.201
We have C(i, j) = 1 for all i, and for all j ≤ .202
We have C(i, j) = 2 for all j > , and for all i ≤ .203
We have C(i, j) = C(j, i) = 3 for all i > , and all j ≥ 1− .204
The original boundary conditions placed constraints only on the outermost grid points, while205
these conditions place constraints on a border of width . We call this modified problem206
-ThickDisBrouwer, which is the same as DiscreteBrouwer, except that the function is207
syntactically required to satisfy the new boundary conditions.208
It is not difficult to produce a polynomial time reduction from DiscreteBrouwer to209
-ThickDisBrouwer. It suffices to increase the number of points in the grid, and then to210
embed the original DiscreteBrouwer instance into the [, 1− ]2 square in the middle of the211
instance. The proof of the following lemma can be found in Appendix C.212
I Lemma 4. DiscreteBrouwer can be reduced in polynomial time to -ThickDisBrouwer.213
Embedding the grid in [0, 1]2. We now reduce -ThickDisBrouwer to 2D-Brouwer. One214
of the keys steps of the reduction is to map points from the continuous space [0, 1]2 to the215
discrete grid G. Specifically, given a point x ∈ [0, 1], we would like to determine the n bits216
that define the integer bx · 2nc.217
Mehta showed that this mapping from continuous points to discrete points can be done218
by a linear arithmetic circuit. Here we give a slightly different formulation that uses only219
gates from the set {c,+b,−b, ∗bc}. Let L be a fixed constant that will be defined later.220
221
SLP 3 ExtractBit(x, b)
b ← 0.5
b ← x -b b
b ← b *b L
SLP 4 ExtractBits(x, b1, b2, . . . , bn)
for i in {1, 2, . . . , n} do
ExtractBit(x, bi)
y ← bi *b 0.5
x ← x -b y
x ← x *b 2
end
222
SLP 3 extracts the first bit of the number x ∈ [0, 1]. The first three lines of the program223
compute the value b = (x−b 0.5) ∗b L. There are three possibilities.224
If x ≤ 0.5, then b = 0.225
If x ≥ 0.5 + 1/L, then b = 1.226
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If 0.5 < x < 0.5 + 1/L, then b will be some number strictly between 0 and 1.227
The first two cases correctly decode the first bit of x, and we call these cases good decodes.228
We will call the third case a bad decode, since the bit has not been decoded correctly.229
SLP 4 extracts the first n bits of x, by extracting each bit in turn, starting with the first230
bit. The three lines after each extraction erase the current first bit of x, and then multiply x231
by two, which means that the next extraction will give us the next bit of x. If any of the232
bit decodes are bad, then this procedure will break, meaning that we only extract the first233
n bits of x in the case where all decodes are good. We say that x is well-positioned if the234
procedure succeeds, and poorly-positioned otherwise.235
Multiple samples. The problem of poorly-positioned points is common in PPAD-hardness236
reductions. Indeed, observe that we cannot define an SLP that always correctly extracts the237
first n bits of x, since this would be a discontinuous function, and all gates in our arithmetic238
circuits compute continuous functions. As in previous works, this is resolved by taking239
multiple samples around a given point. Specifically, for the point p ∈ [0, 1]2, we sample k240
points p1, p2, . . . , pk where pi = p+
(
i−1
(k+1)·2n+1 ,
i−1
(k+1)·2n+1
)
. Mehta proved that there exists241
a setting for L that ensures that there are at most two points that have poorly positioned242
coordinates. We have changed several details, and so we provide our own statement and243
proof here. The proof can be found in Appendix D.244
I Lemma 5. If L = (k + 2) · 2n+1, then at most two of the points p1 through pk have245
poorly-positioned coordinates.246
Evaluating a Boolean circuit. Once we have decoded the bits for a well-positioned point,247
we have a sequence of 0/1 variables. It is easy to simulate a Boolean circuit on these values.248
The operator ¬ x can be simulated by 1−b x.249
The operator x ∨ y can be simulated by x+b y.250
The operator x ∧ y can be simulated by applying De Morgan’s laws and using ∨ and ¬.251
Recall that C outputs one of three possible colors. We also assume, without loss of generality,252
that C gives its output as a one-hot vector. This means that there are three Boolean outputs253
x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1}3 of the circuit. The color 1 is represented by the vector (1, 0, 0), the color254
2 is represented as (0, 1, 0), and color 3 is represented as (0, 0, 1). If the simulation is applied255
to a point with well-positioned coordinates, then the circuit will output one of these three256
vectors, while if it is applied to a point with poorly positioned coordinates, then the circuit257
will output some value x ∈ [0, 1]3 that has no particular meaning.258
The output. The key idea behind the reduction is that each color will be mapped to a259
displacement vector, as shown in Figure 1b. Here we again deviate from Mehta’s reduction,260
by giving different vectors that will allow us to prove our approximation lower bound.261
Color 1 will be mapped to the vector (0, 1) · .262
Color 2 will be mapped to the vector (1, 1−√2) · .263
Color 3 will be mapped to the vector (−1, 1−√2) · .264
These are irrational coordinates, but in our proofs we argue that a suitably good rational
approximation of these vectors will suffice. We average the displacements over the k different
sampled points to get the final output of the circuit. Suppose that xij denotes output i from
sampled point j. Our circuit will compute
dispx =
k∑
j=1
(x2j − x3j) · 
k
, dispy =
k∑
j=1
(
x1j + (1−
√
2)(x2j + x3j)
) · 
k
.
Finally, we specify F : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 to compute F (x, y) = (x+ dispx · , y + dispy · ).265
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Completing the proof. To find an approximate fixed point of F , we must find a point266
where both dispx and dispy are close to zero. The dotted square in Figure 1b shows the267
set of displacements that satisfy ‖x − (0, 0)‖∞ ≤ (
√
2 − 1) · , which correspond to the268
displacements that would be (
√
2− 1) · -fixed points.269
The idea is that, if we do not sample points of all three colors, then we cannot produce a270
displacement that is strictly better than an (
√
2− 1) · -fixed point. For example, if we only271
have points of colors 1 and 2, then the displacement will be some point on the dashed line272
between the red and blue vectors in Figure 1b. This line touches the box of (
√
2− 1) · -fixed273
points, but does not enter it. It can be seen that the same property holds for the other pairs274
of colors: we specifically chose the displacement vectors in order to maximize the size of the275
inscribed square shown in Figure 1b.276
The argument is complicated by the fact that two of our sampled points may have poorly277
positioned coordinates, which may drag the displacement towards (0, 0). However, this effect278
can be minimized by taking a large number of samples. We show show the following lemma.279
I Lemma 6. Let ′ < (
√
2− 1) ·  be a constant. There is a sufficiently large constant k such280
that, if ‖x− F (x)‖∞ < ′, then x is contained in a trichromatic square.281
The proof of Lemma 6 can be found in Appendix E. Since  can be fixed to be any282
constant strictly less than 0.5, we obtain the following.283
I Theorem 7. Given a 2D-Brouwer instance, it is PPAD-hard to find a point x ∈ [0, 1]2 s.t.284
‖x− F (x)‖∞ < (
√
2− 1)/2 ≈ 0.2071.285
Reducing 2D-Brouwer to 2D-LinearFIXP is easy, since the gates {c,+b,−b, ∗bc} can be286
simulated by the gates {c,+,−, ∗c,max,min}. This implies that it is PPAD-hard to find an287
-fixed point of a 2D-LinearFIXP instance with  < (
√
2− 1)/2.288
It should be noted that an -approximate fixed point can be found in polynomial time if289
the function has a suitably small Lipschitz constant, by trying all points in a grid of width .290
We are able to obtain a lower bound for constant  because our functions have exponentially291
large Lipschitz constants.292
4 Hardness of 2D-Brouwer with a constant width circuit293
In our reduction from 2D-Brouwer to tree polymatrix games, the number of actions in the294
game will be determined by the width of the circuit. This means that the hardness proof295
from the previous section is not a sufficient starting point, because it produces 2D-Brouwer296
instances that have circuits with high width. In particular, the circuits will extract 2n bits297
from the two inputs, which means that the circuits will have width at least 2n.298
Since we desire a constant number of actions in our tree polymatrix game, we need to299
build a hardness proof for 2D-Brouwer that produces a circuit with constant width. In this300
section we do exactly that, by reimplementing the reduction from the previous section using301
gadgets that keep the width small.302
Bit packing. We adopt an idea of Elkind, Goldberg, and Goldberg [9], to store many bits303
in a single arithmetic value using a packed representation. Given bits b1, b2, . . . , bk ∈ {0, 1},304
the packed representation of these bits is the value packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk) :=
∑k
i=1 bi/2i. We305
will show that the reduction from the previous section can be performed while keeping all306
Boolean values in a single variable that uses packed representation.307
Working with packed variables. We build SLPs that work with this packed representation,308
two of which are shown below.309
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310
SLP 5 FirstBit(x, b) +0 variables
// Extract the first bit of x
into b
b ← 0.5
b ← x -b b
b ← b *b L
// Remove the first bit of x
b ← b *b 0.5
x ← x -b b
x ← x *b 2
b ← b *b 2
SLP 6 Clear(I, x) +2 variables
x’ ← x *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , k} do
b ← 0
FirstBit(x’, b)
if i ∈ I then
b ← b *b 12i
x ← x -b b
end
end
311
The FirstBit SLP combines the ideas from SLPs 3 and 4 to extract the first bit from a312
value x ∈ [0, 1]. Repeatedly applying this SLP allows us to read out each bit of a value in313
sequence. The Clear SLP uses this to set some bits of a packed variable to zero. It takes as314
input a set of indices I, and a packed variable x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk). At the end of the315
SLP we have x = packed(b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k) where b′i = 0 whenever i ∈ I, and b′i = bi otherwise.316
It first copies x to a fresh variable x′. The bits of x′ are then read-out using FirstBit.317
Whenever a bit bi with i ∈ I is decoded from x′, we subtract bi/2i from x. If bi = 1, then318
this sets the corresponding bit of x to zero, and if bi = 0, then this leaves x unchanged.319
We want to minimize the the width of the circuit that we produce, so we keep track of320
the number of extra variables used by our SLPs. For FirstBit, this is zero, while for Clear321
this is two, since that SLP uses the fresh variables x′ and b.322
Packing and unpacking bits. We implement two SLPs that manipulated packed variables.323
The Pack(x, y, S) operation allows us to extract bits from y ∈ [0, 1], and store them in324
x, while the Unpack(x, y, S) operation allows us to extract bits from x to create a value325
y ∈ [0, 1]. This is formally specified in the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix F.326
I Lemma 8. Suppose that we are given x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk), a variable y ∈ [0, 1], and327
a sequence of indices S = 〈s1, s2, . . . , sj〉. Let yj denote the jth bit of y. The following SLPs328
can be implemented using at most two extra variables.329
Pack(x, y, S) modifies x so that x = packed(b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k) where b′i = yj whenever330
there exists an index sj ∈ S with sj = i, and b′i = bi otherwise.331
Unpack(x, y, S) modifies y so that y = y +b
∑j
i=1 bsi/2i332
Simulating a Boolean operations. As described in the previous section, the reduction333
only needs to simulate or- and not-gates. Given x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bk), and three indices334
i1, i2, i3, we implement two SLPs, which both modify x so that x = packed(b′1, b′2, . . . , b′k).335
SLP 7 implements Or(x, i1, i2, i3), which ensures that b′i3 = bi1 ∨ bi2 , and b′i = bi for i 6= i3.336
SLP 8 implements Not(x, i1, i2), which ensures that b′i2 = ¬bi1 , and b′i = bi for i 6= i2.337
These two SLPs simply unpack the input bits, perform the operation, and then pack338
the result into the output bit. The Or SLP uses the Unpack operation to set a = bi1 +b bi2 .339
Both SLPs use three extra variables: the fresh variable a is live throughout, and the pack340
and unpack operations use two extra variables. The variable b in the Not SLP is not live341
concurrently with a pack or unpack, and so does not increase the number of live variables.342
These two SLPs can be used to simulate a Boolean circuit using at most three extra variables.343
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SLP 7 Or(x, i1, i2, i3) +3 vari-
ables
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i1〉)
Unpack(x, a, 〈i2〉)
Pack(x, a, 〈i3〉)
SLP 8 Not(x, i1, i2) +3 vari-
ables
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i1〉)
b ← 1
a ← b -b a
Pack(x, a, 〈i2〉)
I Lemma 9. Let C be a Boolean circuit with n inputs and k gates. Suppose that x =344
packed(b1, . . . , bn), gives values for the inputs of the circuit. There is an SLP Simulate(C, x)345
that uses three extra variables, and modifies x so that x = packed(b1, . . . , bn, bn+1, . . . , bn+k),346
where bn+i is the output of gate i of the circuit.347
Implementing the reduction. Finally, we can show that the circuit built in Theorem 7348
can be implemented by an SLP that uses at most 8 variables. This SLP cycles through each349
sampled point in turn, computes the x and y displacements by simulating the Boolean circuit,350
and then adds the result to the output. The following theorem is proved in Appendix H351
I Theorem 10. Given a 2D-Brouwer instance, it is PPAD-hard to find a point x ∈ [0, 1]2352
with ‖x− F (x)‖∞ <
√
2−1
2 even for a synchronous circuit of width eight.353
5 Hardness for tree polymatrix games354
Now we show that finding a Nash equilibrium of a tree polymatrix game is PPAD-hard. We355
reduce from the low-width 2D-Brouwer problem, whose hardness was shown in Theorem 10.356
Throughout this section, we suppose that we have a 2D-Brouwer instance defined by a357
synchronous arithmetic circuit F of width eight and depth n. The gates of this circuit will be358
indexed as gi,j where 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n, meaning that gi,j is the ith gate on level j.359
Modifying the circuit. The first step of the reduction is to modify the circuit. First,360
we modify the circuit so that all gates operate on values in [0, 0.1], rather than [0, 1]. We361
introduce the operators +b0.1, −b0.1, and ∗b0.1, which bound their outputs to be in [0, 0.1]. The362
following lemma, proved in Appendix I, states that we can rewrite our circuit using these363
new gates. The transformation simply divides all c-gates in the circuit by ten.364
I Lemma 11. Given an arithmetic circuit F : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 that uses gates from365
{c,+b,−b, ∗b}, we can construct a circuit F ′ : [0, 0.1]2 → [0, 0.1]2 that uses the gates from366
{c,+b0.1,−b0.1, ∗b0.1}, so that F (x, y) = (x, y) if and only if F ′(x/10, y/10) = (x/10, y/10).367
Next we modify the structure of the circuit by connecting the two outputs of the circuit368
to its two inputs. Suppose, without loss of generality, that g7,1 and g8,1 are the inputs and369
that g7,n and g8,n are outputs. Note that the equality x = y can be implemented using the370
gate x = y ∗b0.1 1. We add the following extra equalities, which are shown in Figure 2.371
We add gates g9,n−1 = g7,n and g10,n−1 = g8,n.372
For each j in the range 2 ≤ j < n− 1, we add g9,j = g9,j+1 and g10,j = g10,j+1.373
We modify g7,1 so that g7,1 = g9,2, and we modify g8,1 so that g8,1 = g10,2.374
Note that these gates are backwards: they copy values from higher levels in the circuit to375
lower levels, and so the result is not a circuit, but a system of constraints defined by gates,376
with some structural properties. Firstly, each gate gi,j is only involved in constraints with377
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g1,1 g2,1 · · · g7,1 g8,1 g9,1 g10,1
g1,2 g2,2 · · · g7,2 g8,2 g9,2 g10,2
...
...
...
...
...
...
g1,n g2,n g7,n g8,n g9,n g10,n· · ·
Figure 2 Extra equalities to introduce feedback of g7,n and g8,n to g7,1 and g8,1 respectively.
v1
m1
c1
m2
v2
m3
c2
m4
v3
m5
. . . vn
m2n−1
Figure 3 The structure of the polymatrix game.
gates of the form gi′,j+1 and gi′,j−1. Secondly, finding values for the gates that satisfy all of378
the constraints is PPAD-hard, since by construction such values would yield a fixed point of F .379
The polymatrix game. The polymatrix game will contain three types of players.380
For each i = 1, . . . , n, we have a variable player vi.381
For each i = 1, . . . , n− 1, we have a constraint player ci, who is connected to vi and vi+1.382
For each i = 1, . . . , 2n− 1, we have a mix player mi. If i is even, then mi is connected383
to ci/2. If i is odd, then mi is connected to v(i+1)/2.384
The structure of this game is shown in Figure 3. Each player has twenty actions, which are385
divided into ten pairs, xi and x¯i for i = 1, . . . , 10.386
Forcing mixing. The role of the mix players is to force the variable and constraint387
players to play specific mixed strategies: for every variable or constraint player j, we want388
sj(xi) + sj(x¯i) = 0.1 for all i, which means that the same amount of probability is assigned389
to each pair of actions. To force this, each mix player plays a high-stakes hide-and-seek390
against their opponent, which is shown in Figure 4. This zero-sum game is defined by a391
20× 20 matrix Z and a constant M . The payoff Zij is defined as follows. If i ∈ {xa, x¯a} and392
j ∈ {xa, x¯a} for some a, then Zij = M . Otherwise, Zij = 0. For each i the player mi plays393
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· · ·
. . .
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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−M
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−M
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−M
M
−M
x¯20
x20
x¯20 x20
Figure 4 The hide and seek game that forces cj/2 to play an appropriate mixed strategy. The
same game is used to force v(j−1)/2 mixes appropriately.
against player j, which is either a constraint player ci′ or a variable player vi′ . We define394
the payoff matrix Ami,j = Z and Gj,mi = −Z. The following lemma, proved in Appendix J,395
shows that if M is suitably large, then the variable and constraint players must allocate396
probability 0.1 to each of the ten action pairs.397
I Lemma 12. Suppose that all payoffs in the games between variable and constraint players398
use payoffs in the range [−P, P ]. If M > 40 · P then in every mixed Nash equilibrium s, the399
action sj of every variable and constraint player j satisfies sj(xi) + sj(x¯i) = 0.1 for all i.400
Gate gadgets. We now define the payoffs for variable and constraint players. Actions xi401
and x¯i of variable player vj will represent the output of gate gi,j . Specifically, the probability402
that player vj assigns to action xi will be equal to the output of gi,j . In this way, the strategy403
of variable player vj will represent the output of every gate at level j of the circuit. The404
constraint player cj enforces all constraints between the gates at level j and the gates at405
level j + 1. To simulate each gate, we will embed one of the gate gadgets from Figure 5,406
which originated from the reduction of DGP [5], into the bimatrix games that involve cj .407
The idea is that, for the constraint player to be in equilibrium, the variable players must408
play xi with probabilities that exactly simulate the original gate. Lemma 12 allows us to409
treat each gate independently: each pair of actions xi and si must receive probability 0.1 in410
total, but the split of probability between xi and si is determined by the gate gadgets.411
Formally, we construct the payoff matrices Avi,ci and Aci,vi+1 for all i < n by first setting412
each payoff to 0. Then, for each gate, we embed the corresponding gate gadget from Figure 5413
into the matrices. For each gate ga,j , we take the corresponding game from Figure 5, and414
embed it into the rows xa and x¯a of a constraint player’s matrix. The diagrams specify415
specific actions of the constraint and variable players that should be modified.416
For gates that originated in the circuit, the gadget is always embedded into the matrices417
Avj−1,cj−1 and Acj−1,vj , the synchronicity of the circuit ensures that the inputs for level418
j gates come from level j − 1 gates. We have also added extra multiplication gates that419
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Figure 5 DGP polymatrix game gadgets.
copy values from the output of the circuit back to the input. These gates are of the form420
gi,j = gi′,j+1, and are embedded into the matrices Avj ,cj and Acj ,vj+1 .421
The following lemma, proved in Appendix K, states that, in every Nash equilibrium, the422
strategies of the variable players exactly simulate the gates that have been embedded.423
I Lemma 13. In every mixed Nash equilibrium s of the game, the following are satisfied for424
each gate gi,j.425
If gi,j = c, then svj (xi) = c.426
If gi,j = gi1,j−1 +b0.1 gi2,j−1, then svj (xi) = svj−1(xi1) +b0.1 svj−1(xi2).427
If gi,j = gi1,j−1 −b0.1 gi2,j−1, then svj (xi) = svj−1(xi1) −b0.1 svj−1(xi2).428
If gi,j = gi1,j′ ∗b0.1 c, then svj (xi) = svj′ (xi1) ∗b0.1 c.429
Lemma 13 says that, in every Nash equilibrium of the game, the strategies of the variable430
players exactly simulate the gates, which by construction means that they give us a fixed431
point of the circuit F . Also note that it is straightforward to give a path decomposition for432
our interaction graph, where each node in the decomposition contains exactly two vertices433
from the game, meaning that the graph has pathwidth 1. So we have proved the following.434
I Theorem 14. It is PPAD-hard to find a Nash equilibrium of a tree polymatrix game, even435
when all players have at most twenty actions and the interaction graph has pathwidth 1.436
6 Open questions437
For polymatrix games, the main open question is to find the exact boundary between438
tractability and hardness. Twenty-action pathwidth-1 tree polymatrix games are hard,439
but two-action path polymatrix games can be solved in polynomial time [9]. What about440
two-action tree polymatrix games, or path-polymatrix games with more than two actions?441
For 2D-Brouwer and 2D-LinearFIXP, the natural question is: for which  is it hard to442
find an -fixed point? We have shown that it is hard for  = 0.2071, while the case for  = 0.5443
is trivial, since the point (0.5, 0.5) must always be a 0.5-fixed point. Closing the gap between444
these two numbers would be desirable.445
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A An issue with the lower bound in [9]481
This section refers to the result in [9], which purports to show that finding a Nash equilibrium482
in a graphical game of pathwidth four is PPAD-hard. Like this paper, their proof reduces from483
discrete Brouwer, but unlike this paper and other work [4,5,12,15], the proof attempts to484
carry out the reduction entirely using Boolean values. In other words, there is no step (like485
Lemmas 4 and 5 in this paper), where the Boolean outputs of the circuit are converted to486
arithmetic values. In all reductions of this type, this is carried out by averaging over multiple487
copies of the circuit, with the understanding that some of the circuits may give nonsensical488
outputs.489
It is difficult to see how a reduction that avoids this step could work. This is because490
the expected payoff for a player in a polymatrix game is a continuous function of the other491
player’s strategies. But attempting to reduce directly from a Boolean circuit would produce492
a function that is discontinuous.493
It seems very likely that the proof in [9] can be repaired by including an explicit averaging494
step, and it this may still result in a graph that has bounded pathwidth, though it is less495
clear that the pathwidth would still be four. On the other hand, our work makes this less496
pressing, since the repaired result would still be subsumed by our lower bound for polymatrix497
games with pathwidth one.498
B Proof of Lemma 1499
Proof. The idea is to make each level of the circuit correspond to a line of the SLP. We500
assume that all for loops have been unrolled, and that all if statements have been resolved.501
Suppose that the resulting SLP has k lines, and furthermore assume that at each line of the502
SLP, we have an indexed list v1, v2, . . . , vl of the variables that are live on each line, where503
of course we have l ≤ w.504
We will build a circuit with k ·w gates, and will index those gates as gi,j , where 1 ≤ i ≤ k505
is a line, and 1 ≤ j ≤ w is a variable. The idea is that the gate gi,j will compute the value of506
the jth live variable on line i. The gate gi,j will be constructed as follows.507
If there are fewer than j variables live at line k of the SLP, then gi,j is a dummy c-gate.508
If line i of the SLP is vj ← op, then we define gi,j = op. If op uses a variable x as an509
input, then by definition, this variable must be live on line i− 1, and so we find the index510
j′ for x on line i− 1, and we substitute gi−1,j′ for x in op. We do this for both arguments511
in the case where op is +b or −b.512
If line i of the SLP does not assign a value to vj , then by definition, the variable must be513
live on line i− 1. As before, let j′ be the index of this variable on line i− 1. We define514
gi,j = gi−1,j′ ∗b 1.515
It is not difficult to see that this circuit exactly simulates the SLP. Moreover, by construction,516
we have d(gi,j) = i. Hence, each level of the circuit has width exactly w, and so the overall517
width of the circuit is w.518
J519
C Proof of Lemma 4520
Proof. Suppose that we are given a DiscreteBrouwer instance defined by a circuit C521
over the grid Gn = {0, 1/2n, 2/2n, . . . , (2n − 1)/2n}2. Let n′ be an integer such that522
2n/2n′ < (1 − 2). We will build an -ThickDisBrouwer instance defined by a circuit C ′523
over the grid Gn′ = {0, 1/2n′ , 2/2n′ , . . . , (2n′ − 1)/2n′}2. We will embed the original instance524
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in the center of the new instance, where the point (x0, y0) = (0.5− 2n−1/2n′ , 0.5− 2n−1/2n′)525
in G′ will correspond to the point (0, 0) in G. We use the following procedure to determine526
the color of a point (x, y) ∈ Gn′ .527
1. If 0 ≤ x− x0 ≤ 2n and 0 ≤ y − y0 ≤ 2n, then C ′(x, y) = C(x− x0, y − y0).528
2. Otherwise, if x− x0 < 0, then C(x, y) = 1.529
3. Otherwise, if y − y0 ≤ 0, then C(x, y) = 2.530
4. Otherwise, C(x, y) = 3.531
Observe that532
x0 = 0.5− 2
n−1
2n′ > 0.5−
(1− 2)
2 = ,533
where the second inequality used the definition of n′. Moreover534
x0 + 2n = 0.5 +
2n−1
2n′ < 0.5 +
(1− 2)
2 = 1− ,535
where again the second inequality used the definition of n′. The same inequalities hold for536
y0. Hence, the first step of our procedure perfectly embeds the original instance into the537
new instance, while the other steps ensure that the -ThickDisBrouwer boundary conditions538
hold.539
Points in the boundary cannot be solutions, because the boundary constraints ensure540
that at least one of the three colors will be missing. Hence, every solution of C ′ on G′ must541
also be a solution of C on G. J542
D Proof of Lemma 5543
Proof. Observe that SLP 3 produces a bad decode if and only if x is in the range [0.5, 0.5 +544
1/L). Since SLP 4 extracts n bits, multiplying x by two each time, it follows that one of the545
decodes will fail if546
x ∈ I(a) =
[
a
2n ,
a
2n +
1
L
)
,547
for some integer a.548
Hence, the point pi = (p1i , p2i ) has a poorly-positioned coordinate if there is some integer a549
such that p1i ∈ I(a), or p2i ∈ I(a). For a fixed dimension j ∈ {1, 2}, we have two properties.550
There cannot be two points pi and pi′ such that pji and p
j
i′ both lie in the same interval551
I(a). This is because the width of the interval is552
1
L
= 1(k + 2) · 2n+1 <
1
(k + 1) · 2n+1 ,553
where the final term is the defined difference between pji and p
j
i+1.554
There cannot be two distinct indices a and a′ such that pji ∈ I(a) and pji′ ∈ I(a′). This is555
because the distance between pj1 and p
j
k is at most556
k · 1(k + 1) · 2n+1 <
1
2n+1 ,557
whereas the distance between any two consecutive intervals I(a) and I(a+ 1) is at least558
a+ 1
2n −
(
a
2n +
1
(k + 2) · 2n+1
)
= 12n −
1
(k + 2) · 2n+1 >
1
2n+1 .559
From these two facts, it follows that there is at most one point that has a poorly-positioned560
coordinate in dimension j, so there can be at most two points that have poorly positioned561
coordinates. J562
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E Proof of Lemma 6563
Proof. We argue that if ‖x − F (x)‖∞ < ′/2, then there exist three indices i1, i2, and i3564
such that pij has well-positioned coordinates, and that the lower-left corner of the square565
containing pij has color j.566
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that this is not true. Then there must be a color567
that is missing, and there are two cases to consider.568
1. First suppose that color 1 is missing. Since there are at most two points with poorly-569
positioned coordinates, we know that we have at least k− 2 points j for which x2j = 1 or570
x3j = 1. Hence we have571
dispy ≤
(
(1−√2)(k − 2)
k
+ 2
k
)
· ,572
where the 2/k term comes from the fact that the poorly positioned points can maximize573
dispy by fixing x1j = 1 and x2j = x3j = 0, and thus can contribute at most 2 · /k to574
the sum.575
As k tends to infinity, the right-hand side converges to (1−√2) · . Since ′ < , we can576
choose a sufficiently large constant k such that dispy < (1 −
√
2) · ′. Now, observing577
that 1−√2 is negative, we get the following578
‖x− F (x)‖∞ >
∣∣∣(1−√2) · ′∣∣∣ = (√2− 1) · ′,579
giving our contradiction.580
2. Now suppose that one of colors 2 or 3 is missing. We will consider the case where color 3581
is missing, as the other case is symmetric. As before, since there are at most two points582
with poorly-positioned coordinates, we know that we have at least k − 2 points j for583
which x1j = 1 or x2j = 1. One of the two following cases applies.584
a. At least (
√
2− 1) · k − 2 well-positioned points satisfy x2j = 1. If this is the case, then585
we have586
dispx ≥
(
(
√
2− 1) · k − 2
k
− 2
k
)
· ,587
where we have used the fact that there are no well positioned points with color 3, and588
the fact that the poorly-positioned points cannot reduce the sum by more than 2·k .589
As k tends to infinity, the right-hand side tends to (
√
2− 1) · , so there is a sufficiently590
large constant k such that dispx > (
√
2− 1) · ′, and so ‖x− F (X)‖∞ > (
√
2− 1) · ′.591
b. At least k − (√2− 1) · k well-positioned points satisfy x1j = 1. In this case we have592
dispy ≥
k∑
j=1
(
x1j − (
√
2− 1)x2j
k
− 2
k
)
· 593
≥

(
k − (√2− 1) · k
)
−
(
(
√
2− 1)(√2− 1) · k
)
k
− 2
k
 · 594
=
(
(
√
2− 1) · k
k
− 2
k
)
· .595
596
The first line of this inequality uses the fact that we have no well-positioned points597
with color 3, and that the poorly-positioned points can reduce the sum by at most 2·k .598
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The second line substitutes the bounds that we have for x1j and x2j . The third line599
uses the fact that
√
2− 1 is a solution of the equation x = 1− x− x2.600
As in the other two cases, this means that we can choose a sufficiently large constant601
k such that ‖x− F (X)‖∞ > (
√
2− 1) · ′.602
Next we observe that the arguments given above all continue to hold if we substitute603
a sufficiently precise rational approximation
√
2 in our displacement vector calculation.604
This is because all three arguments prove that some expression converges to (
√
2− 1) ·  >605
(
√
2− 1) · ′, thus we can replace √2 with any suitably close rational that ensures that606
the expressions converge to (x− 1) ·  > (√2− 1) · ′ for some x.607
So far we have shown that there exist three well-positioned points pi1 , pi2 , and pi3 that608
have three distinct colors. To see that x is contained within a trichromatic square, it609
suffices to observe that ‖pk − p1‖∞ ≤ 1/2k, which means that all three points must be610
contained in squares that are adjacent to the square containing x.611
J612
F Proof of Lemma 8613
We construct SLPs for both of the operations.614
Packing bits. The Pack operation is implemented by the following SLP.615
SLP 9 Pack(x, y, S) +2 variables
Clear(S, x)
y’ ← y *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , j} do
b ← 0
FirstBit(y’, b)
x ← b *b 12si
end
616
SLP 9 implements the pack operation. It begins by clearing the bits referenced by the617
sequence S. It then copies y to y’, and destructively extracts the first j bits of y’. These618
bits are then stored at the correct index in x by the final line of the for loop. In total, this619
SLP uses two additional variables y’ and b. Two extra variables are used by Clear, but620
these stop being live after the first line, before y’ and b become live.621
Unpacking bits. The Unpack operation is implemented by the following SLP.622
SLP 10 Unpack(x, y, S) +2 variables
x’ ← x *b 1
for i in {1, 2, . . . , k} do
b ← 0
FirstBit(x’, b)
if i = sj for some j then
b ← b *b 12sj
y ← y +b b
end
end
623
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SLP 10 implements the unpacking operation. It first copies x to x’, and then destructively624
extracts the first k bits of x’. Whenever a bit referred to by S is extracted from x’, it is625
first multiplied by 12sj , which puts it at the correct position, and is then added to y. This626
SLP uses the two additional variables x’ and b.627
G Proof of Lemma 9628
Simulating a Boolean circuit. Let 〈gn+1, gn+2, . . . , gn+k〉 be the gates of the circuit, and629
suppose, without loss of generality, that the gates have been topologically ordered. The630
following SLP will simulate the circuit C.631
SLP 11 Simulate(C, x) +3 variables
for i in {n+ 1, n+ 2, . . . , n+ k} do
if gi = gj1 ∨ gj2 then
Or(x, i, j1, j2)
end
if gi = ¬gj then
Not(x, i, j)
end
end
632
Assuming that the first n bits of x already contain the packed inputs of the circuit, SLP 11633
implements the operation Simulate(C, x) that computes the output of each gate. This simply634
iterates through and simulates each gate. The SLP introduce no new variables, and so it635
uses three additional live variables in total, which come from the Or and Not operations.636
H Proof of Theorem 10637
Dealing with the output. Recall that our Boolean circuit will output three bits, and that638
these bits determine which displacement vector is added to the output of the arithmetic circuit.639
We now build an SLP that does this conversion. It implements AddVector(x, i, outx, outy, k, dx, dy),640
where x = packed(b1, b2, . . . , bn), i ≤ n is an index, outx and outy are variables, k is an641
integer, and dx, dy ∈ [−1, 1]. After this procedure, we should have outx = outx + dx · bi/k,642
and outy = outy + dy · bi/k. SLP 12 does this operation. It uses three extra variables in643
total: the fresh variable a is live throughout, and the two unpack operations use two extra644
variables.645
XX:20 Tree Polymatrix Games are PPAD-hard
SLP 12 AddVector(x, i, outx, outy, dx, dy, k) +3
variables
// Add dx · bi to outx
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i〉)
a ← |dx|/k *b a
outx ← outx +b a // Use -b if dx < 0
// Add dy · bi to outy
a ← 0
Unpack(x, a, 〈i〉)
a ← |dy|/k *b a
outy ← outy +b a // Use -b if dy < 0
646
Implementing the reduction. Finally, we can implement the reduction from DiscreteBrouwer647
to 2D-Brouwer. We will assume that we have been given a Boolean circuit C that takes 2n648
inputs, where the first n input bits correspond to the x coordinate, and the second n input649
bits correspond to the y coordinate. Recall that we have required that C gives its output as650
a one-hot vector. We assume that the three output bits of C are indexed n+ k− 2, n+ k− 1,651
and n+ k, corresponding to colors 1, 2, and 3, respectively.652
SLP 13 Reduction(inx, iny, outx, outy) +4 variables
outx ← inx
outy ← iny
for i in {1, 2, . . . , k} do
inx ← inx +b 1/((k + 1) · 2n+1)
iny ← iny +b 1/((k + 1) · 2n+1)
x ← 0
Pack(x, inx, 〈1, 2, . . . , n〉)
Pack(x, iny, 〈n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n〉)
Simulate(C, x)
AddVector(x, n+k-2, outx, outy, k, 0, 1)
AddVector(x, n+k-1, outx, outy, k, 1,
1-
√
2)
AddVector(x, n+k , outx, outy, k, -1,
1-
√
2)
end
653
SLP 13 implements the reduction. The variables inx and iny hold the inputs to the circuit,654
while the variables outx and outy are the outputs. The SLP first copies the inputs to the655
outputs, and then modifies the outputs using the displacement vectors. Each iteration of the656
for loop computes the computes the displacement contributed by the point pi (defined in657
the previous section). This involves decoding the first n bits of both inx and iny, which can658
be done via the pack operation, simulating the circuit on the resulting bits, and then adding659
the correct displacement vectors to outx and outy.660
The correctness of this SLP follows from our correctness proof for Theorem 7, since all661
we have done in this section is reimplement while using a small number of live variables. In662
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total, this SLP uses four extra variables. All of the macros use at most three extra variables,663
and the fresh variable x during these macros. Since inx iny, outx and outy are all live664
throughout as well, this gives us 8 live variables in total.665
I Proof of Lemma 11666
Proof. The circuit F ′ consists of gates g′i,j for each 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 and 1 ≤ j ≤ n.667
If gi,j = c, then g′i,j = c/10.668
If gi,j = ga,b +b gx,y, then g′i,j = g′a,b +b0.1 g′x,y.669
If gi,j = ga,b −b gx,y, then g′i,j = g′a,b −b0.1 g′x,y.670
If gi,j = ga,b ∗b c, then g′i,j = g′a,b ∗b0.1 c.671
Let (x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2. It is not difficult to show by induction, that if we compute F (x, y) and672
F ′(x/10, y/10), then g′i,j = gi,j/10 for all i and j. Hence, F (x, y) = (x, y) if and only if673
F ′(x/10, y/10) = (x/10, y/10). J674
J Proof of Lemma 12675
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium s in which676
there is some variable or constraint player j that fails to satisfy this equality. Let I be the677
subset of indices that maximize the expression sj(xi) + sj(x¯i), ie., I contains the pairs that678
player j plays with highest probability. Note that since player j does not play all pairs679
uniformly, I does not contain every index, so let J be the non-empty set of indices not in I.680
Let mk be the mix player who plays against player j. By construction, the actions xi681
and x¯i have payoff (sj(xi) + sj(x¯i)) ·M for mk. Since s is a Nash equilibrium, mk may only682
place probability on actions that are best responses, which means that he may only place683
probability on the actions xi and x¯i when i ∈ I.684
Let i be an index that maximizes smk(xi)+smk(x¯i) for playermk. By the above argument,685
we have i ∈ I. The actions xi and x¯i for player j give payoff at most686
2P −M · (smk(xi) + smk(x¯i)) ≤ 2P −M/10687
< −2P.688
689
The first expression uses 2P as the maximum possible payoff that player j can obtain from690
the two other games in which he is involved. The first inequality uses the fact that i was the691
pair with maximal probability, and there are exactly 10 pairs. The second inequality uses692
the fact that M/10 > 4P .693
On the other hand, let i′ be an index in J . By the argument above, we have smk(xi′) +694
smk(x¯i′) = 0. Hence, the payoff of actions xi′ and x¯i′ to player j is at least −2P , since that695
is the lowest payoff that he can obtain from the other two games in which he is involved.696
But now we have arrived at our contradiction. Player j places non-zero probability on at697
least one action xi or x¯i with i ∈ I that is not a pure best response. Hence s cannot be a698
Nash equilibrium. J699
K Proof of Lemma 13700
Proof. We can actually prove this lemma for all four gates simultaneously. Let j′ be the701
index constraint player into which the gate gadget is embedded. Observe that all four games702
for the four gate types have a similar structure: The payoffs for actions xi and x¯i for player703
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vj are identical across all four games, and the payoff of action xi for cj′ are also identical;704
the only thing that differs between the gates is the payoff to player cj′ for action x¯i. We705
describe these differences using a function f .706
For c-gates, we define f(s) = c.707
For +b0.1-gates, we define f(s) = svj−1(xi1) + svj−1(xi1).708
For −b0.1-gates, we define f(s) = svj−1(xi1) − svj−1(xi1).709
For ∗b0.1-gates, we define f(s) = svj′ (xi1) ∗ c.710
Observe that the payoff of action x¯i to player cj′ is f(s). To prove the lemma, we must show
that player vj plays xi with probability
min(max(f(s), 0.1), 0).
There are three cases to consider.711
If f(s) ≤ 0, then we argue that svj (xi) = 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that712
player vj places non-zero probability on action xi. Then action xi for player cj′ will have713
payoff strictly greater than zero, whereas action x¯i will have payoff f(s) ≤ 0. Hence, in714
equilibrium, cj′ cannot play action x¯i. Lemma 12 then implies that player cj′ must play715
xi with probability 0.1. If cj′ does this, then the payoff to vj for xi will be zero, and716
the payoff to vj for x¯i will be 0.1. This means that vj places non-zero probability on an717
action that is not a best response, and so is a contradiction.718
If f(s) ≥ 0.1, then we argue that svj (xi) = 0.1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction719
with Lemma 12 that svj (x¯i) > 0. Observe that the payoff to player cj′ of action x¯i is720
f(s) ≥ 0.1, whereas the payoff to player cj′ of action xi is svj (xi) < 0.1. So to be in721
equilibrium and consistent with Lemma 12, player cj′ must place 0.1 probability on action722
x¯i, and 0 probability on action xi. But this means that the payoff of action x¯i to player723
vj is zero, while the payoff of action xi to player vj is 0.1. Hence player vj has placed724
non-zero probability on an action that is not a pure best response, and so we have our725
contradiction.726
If 0 < f(s) < 0.1, then we argue that svj (xi) = f(s). We first prove that player cj′ must727
play both xi and x¯i with positive probability.728
If player cj′ does not play x¯i then player vj will not play xi, and player cj′ will receive729
payoff 0, but in this scenario he could get f(s) > 0 by playing x¯i instead of his current730
strategy.731
If player cj′ does not play xi then player vj will not play x¯i. Player cj′ will receive732
payoff f(s) for playing x¯i, but in this scenario he could receive payoff 1 > f(s) for733
playing xi instead.734
In order for player cj′ to mix over xi and x¯i in equilibrium, their payoffs must be equal.735
This is only the case when svj (xi) = f(s).736
J737
